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Exhibits from the Life of Bodies
1278.  An abbot returns to the village of Sedlec, Czechoslovakia from 
the Holy Land, bearing a handful of earth taken from Golgotha, the 
“Place of the Skull.” On account of this pious deed, the burial plots 
around the Church of All Saints become prime real estate for noble-
men wishing to jump queue at the resurrection.  The cemetery is 
soon filled to bursting, and will continue to overflow into the ossu-
ary until the 1870s, when the artist František Rint is commissioned 
to beautify the premises.  Among his masterpieces are a chandelier 
said to feature every bone in the human body, and four pyramidal 
stacks of tiered remains.  It is a true Golgotha in its own imposing 
right, and the perfection of the Medieval genre of memento mori - not 
to mention host to a constant procession of tourists.  In 2005, an ex-
hibition of dissected human bodies, posed and plastinated, opens in 
Tampa, Florida.  Pitched as an educational opportunity, the proces-
sion encounters the usual opposition from religious groups, in-
censed at this blatant act of desecration, as well as an unexpected 
obstacle.  The exhibition’s eponymous bodies were, it seems, do-
nated by the Chinese government, having no next of kin, nor any 
verificatory papers.  Given the established link between the Chinese 
prison-industrial complex and the black market in body parts, this 
lack of due process is enough in itself to make anyone with the least 
imagination nauseous.
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Human rights advocacy groups have hounded the exhibition in 
its travels from day one; and yet their vigorous defense of human 
dignity qua rights is not itself uncomplicated.  For the legal terms by 
which one may reproach China, as a pertinent example, for viola-
tions of human rights require that China defer to international de-
mands; consider how China’s human rights record is more often 
than not called to account under the sign of free trade, as part of the 
imperative to ethical consumership in the West.  To this end, China 
may be accountable to human rights only insofar as they are co-ex-
tensive with the demands placed upon the individual by Capital; 
the proper name for those networks which, in the case of Bodies, 
absolve the exhibitors of responsibility for the terms of the bodies’ 
(or any indeed, resource’s) extraction.  In his Declaration of the 
Rights of Human Beings, Raoul Vaneigem describes the right to 
survival under such mercantile conditions as little more than a 
“stay of execution” in exchange for the reproduction of oneself as a 
commodity, an amnesty “granted to anyone who assumes it ‘by the 
sweat of his brow’” (Vaneigem 2003, 2).
Does this not resonate with the teachings of Paul, in whom we 
may find the earliest articulation of a pan-cultural, universal law 
outstripping any local, political instantiation; like human rights, a 
dignity afforded to all regardless of social station? Yet  salvation 
proceeds from a conscious affirmation of oneself as the subject of 
said grace; and then from the point - made emphatically by Paul, 
who cites his own toil amid the Thessalonians as an example – that 
heavenly salvation demands hard labour on the earth, in order that 
one may transcend this plane altogether.  That one ought not to seek 
earthly fulfilment, rather purposing oneself at a world to come – 
this is a faith traces of which remain throughout the Sedlec Ossuary, 
where the temporal innovation of Christianity (which had earlier 
posited a free subject against the backdrop of extant determinist 
cosmologies) granted its dead antecedence over the merely punc-
tual living.  “For this we say to you by the word of the Lord, that we 
who are alive and remain until the coming of the Lord will by no 
means precede those who are asleep” (Thessalonians 4:15).   A six-
teenth-century edition of the woodcuts of Hans Holbein the Young-
er, whose depictions of the Dance of Death more or less codified the 
genre in the medievalist’s imaginary, expands on this scripture ac-
cordingly:  “As sleep does not extinguish man, but holds the body 
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in repose for a time; so Death does not destroy man, but deprives 
his body of its movements and operations” (Holbein 1971, 9).
But the Bodies exhibition, unlike the Sedlec Ossuary, does not 
depict such a suspension; it is a straightforward celebration of vi-
vacity.  Contorted into positions of play, the bodies on display are a 
depiction of the machine beneath the ephemeral rituals of life, and 
do not indicate any further horizon.  Reconstructed bodies, denud-
ed of their skin, are posed throughout as though playing basketball 
or football, riding a bicycle, even  conducting an orchestra.  One 
flensed specimen assumes the contemplative posture of Rodin’s ‘Le 
Penseur,’ a properly philosophic corpse.  The horror consists herein; 
that those whose bodies these once were are perhaps more alive in 
death than in life, which they may have endured in forced confine-
ment, or worse.  The supra-political, ultra-secular excuse for these 
grotesqueries is that, as Dylan Thomas put it, “after the first death, 
there is no other” (Thomas 2003, 106).  For what further degrada-
tions can one suffer after death? It is written in the Gospel of Luke, 
“Be not afraid of them that kill the body, and after that have no 
more that they can do” (Luke 12:4).   And yet in Tudor England, 
contrary to this wisdom, only the bodies of murderers and crimi-
nals could be used for scientific ends, for they were not among 
those to be resurrected at the Second Coming.  But again, as Bodies 
supporters would say, this would be to miss the point.  We are not 
awaiting the resurrection, and these people were already dead.  So 
what constitutes complicity? (One may be reminded of the Bud-
dhist view that it is permissible to eat meat only if it has not been 
slaughtered on one’s behalf.)
That Bodies makes claims for itself as an educational tool, offer-
ing an illuminating glimpse of the body as it appears to the God’s-
eye-view of modern medicine, needn’t undermine its theological 
suggestiveness.  Žižek points out the underlying notion of vanitas 
present in the first media coverage of the technology of the X-ray; 
a technology which enables us “to see a person who is alive as if 
he were already dead, reduced to a mere skeleton;” an intimation 
of mortality shared by Hans Castorp in The Magic Mountain. 
Žižek cites Virilio, for whom the object becomes perceptible only 
when immobilized, and goes on to describe eighteenth-century 
tableaux vivantes, which can be “inserted into the long ideological 
tradition of conceiving of a statue as a frozen, immobilized living 
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body, a body whose movements are paralysed (usually by a kind 
of evil spell):  the statue’s immobility thus involves infinite pain 
...” (Žižek 1997, 87).
It is this infinite pain we can observe in such an exhibition.  The 
Bodies display does not function as a danse macabre; but what if this 
is because it does not, after the silence of the organizers becomes 
(in the imaginary) an admission of guilt, suitably address itself to 
the universal, instead referring to a particular atrocity, horrifying 
in its specificity and contemporaneity?
Perhaps this sense of being surrounded by thinly disguised atroc-
ity, even in the modern world, is the elusive subject of Reggio’s film 
Naqoyqatsi, the third installment in his heavy-handed triptych of 
non-narrative montage.  From its opening shot, which pans across a 
derelict neo-classical edifice, to the three-dimensional computer im-
aging of the human body which recurs throughout, from CAT scans 
to stills from primitive VR, the film plumbs vast, uncanny valleys of 
body worship to present a cluttered but extensive co-theory of hu-
man and technological expansion.  The Hobbesian connotation of its 
title (“Naqoyqatsi” is a Hopi word meaning roughly “life as war”) is 
telling of its relentlessly, aimlessly pessimistic content.  Power and 
resistance both find merely rote expression here.  The images of 
atrocity that appear are simultaneous depictions of celebrity; in-
famous despots whose faces stand in for their crimes, or of bodies 
repetitively piled to the point of stylization; contorted glyphs of hu-
man suffering.  In the vertiginous, high-speed world which the film 
seeks to depict, we cannot apprehend the object unless it is fixed to 
the spot.  A lengthy, panoramic shot of famous faces from a wax 
museum illustrates this point precisely.  One needs no reminder that 
the historical Madame Tussaud was a French noblewoman, tasked 
during the Revolution with casting the deathmasks of prominent 
society people who had fallen victim to the guillotine.  Today, the 
wax museum that she founded in London includes the likenesses of 
living icons as disparate as Lady Gaga and Vladimir Putin.
Such figures are the inverse likeness of those on display in the 
Bodies exhibit.  There we find actual bodies, meticulously recon-
structed, that they may lay bare the ultimate sameness of the finely 
calibrated machines called human.  The stark presence of each un-
manned body is compounded by the troubling obscurity of the 
donors, who themselves may have been disappeared, reduced to 
kvarter
a ademisk
academic quarter
Volume
Exhibits from the Life of Bodies
Cam Scott
05 68
political and social non-entities.  On the other hand, the wax man-
nequins displayed at Madame Tussaud’s are not bodies, though 
they have bodily presence.  They are mere façades of human identi-
ty, but each, for being the likeness of a celebrated person, has the 
aura of a singularity, even of historicity, which is precisely the qual-
ity that the Bodies exhibit denies its wares.
If, as Barthes remarks, the function of mythology is to immobilize 
the world, then the relation of celebrity to life is fundamentally an-
tagonistic.  In partaking of celebrity idolatry, the mythological like-
nesses in which we are so pruriently invested both feel and suffer 
on behalf of the passive viewer, a unilateral relationship made pos-
sible only by our sanitary distance from the object of idolization.
This relationship is troubled now by the vastly expanded territo-
rial claims of the Spectacle, as popular culture explodes into billions 
of little self-employed pieces, but its highest expression may be pre-
served in the brilliant, ideographic portraits produced by Andy 
Warhol; celebrity likenesses haloed in colour, like Orthodox reli-
gious icons - an oft-cited resemblance, foregrounded in recent War-
hol exhibits at the Byzantine and Christian Museum in Athens.  But 
the 2-dimensionality of the icon in religious painting, before and 
contemporary with the Italian Renaissance, fulfilled its function of 
illustration without idolization, as contrasted with the Pagan tradi-
tion of sculpture.  These likenesses were possessed of a symbolic 
power precisely because they were divested of any virtual function. 
And perspective arrived in painting with the discovery of a fixed 
point of view; therefrom, writes John Berger, “all reality (could be) 
mechanically measured by its materiality” (Berger 2008, 81).   Berg-
er’s lapsarian account of art as a falling away from an unmediated 
reality begs the question, “What other measure is there?” but the 
answer may already lie within his formulation.
Peter Sloterdijk finds that “the philosophical basis of Renaissance 
painting was a radical shift in its truth model,” as “the European 
West exchanged primal images for primal scenes” (Sloterdijk 2011, 
156).  In what he deems a semio-political decision, the Renaissance 
brought about a novelization of pictorial space, emphasizing the 
relation of subjects in the depth of a shared world, while the Eastern 
style of icon painting “continued to base its image concept on the 
statuesque elevation and immobilization of the ideas shining in” 
(Sloterdijk 2011, 156).  The objectification of the world, that it may 
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straight-forwardly signify, depends upon the petrification of rela-
tions; thus every likeness gains a shadow, an uncanny social-empir-
ical avatar.  It is this virtual reality that precedes the electronic se-
quel; wherein our interaction with a lifeworld is belied by (or finds 
its meaning in) ruthless mathematization.  Here too, the semio-po-
litical cleft occurs, between orders of exceptional and integrated 
signs.  We can observe a similar succession between primitive, 
twentieth-century virtual realities, where, Eric McLuhan claims, 
soft-focus brings the viewer back to the sensory modes of the early 
middle ages, before the invention of pictorial space, and the lush, 
immersive 3-D of films like Avatar, where the eyes converge stereo-
scopically upon a vivid, involving landscape.  Even today, one can-
not help but wonder what will happen when these incipient tech-
nologies advance to the point where nothing would appear to be 
out of place, and one can relate to a programmed non-presence as 
they would an actual, bodily form.  To this end, there have emerged 
entire edifying, heroic genres of science fiction based on the strug-
gle of the individual against such a regime of inauthenticity.
Consider the pop-culture fascination which most resonates with 
the iconography of the Bodies exhibition, namely, zombie lore; the 
vision of one’s neighbours reduced to ravenous, thoughtless au-
tomatons.  Like the Medieval danse macabre, like the Bodies ex-
hibit, these are the index and not the symbolization of death, a 
re-materialization of the folkloric figure of the “Undead.” The Vic-
torian ghost story, wherein a tormented soul survives its bodily 
prison and continues to rehearse its trauma in an endless repeti-
tion, is superseded by the more properly apocalyptic nightmare of 
an unfeeling, unthinking body, reduced to its basest appetites.  If 
this fascination can be read as an unconscious response to the pre-
vailing physicalist description of the human, one may readily ap-
prehend how each campfire tale relates to the most chastening psy-
chological model of its time.  Sloterdijk suggests that the advent of 
dissection “brought forth a new conception of the human being as 
a wondrous manufacture of the organs,” and how this new eye on 
the body created the effect that “humans, above all relationships 
to others of their kind, were firstly and ultimately single, unre-
lated bodies,” only later sorted into social groups (Sloterdijk 2011, 
126).  The present-day vogue of the “living dead” speaks to exactly 
such a fanatical insistence on sovereignty and self-differentiation 
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against a homogenous mass; the survivor is not for life exactly, but 
she is certainly against death.   
Foucault writes of how the emergence of a clinical pathology 
brought about the dispersal of death in time; how the study of dis-
ease altered our perception of death, from a simple end to life, 
which was reconfigured as a series of “separate, partial, progres-
sive deaths” (Foucault 2003, 177) to a constant companion.  Con-
sidered in this light, a whole genre of memento mori commences 
with an affront to religious superstition, and is itself of the Enlight-
enment.  Pathology made of the body a kind of arrow in time, bi-
secting life and death.  It is this object that is traced by the camera 
of Stan Brakhage in “The Act of Seeing With One’s Own Eyes,” a 
grimly silent film depicting numerous autopsies performed in a 
Pittsburgh morgue.  “The Act ...” is, for its intense focus, its crucial 
sense of gradual revelation in time, its sustained interest, and its 
inquisitive, highly subjective camera work, a decidedly opposite 
film to the above mentioned Naqoyqatsi – an explosive barrage of 
images projected through the screen, as they are strewn through 
time and space.  The collaged surface of the film stands in direct 
contrast to the ocular analogy of Brakhage’s camera work, as well 
as the sense of the title.  (From the literal sense of the word “au-
topsy,” combining autos, self, and opsis, sight.) Naqoyqatsi offers us 
a view from nowhere.  Here, the film screen is a moral technology, 
and its subject is the same abstract human who is the subject of 
abstract “rights.” Brakhage, on the other hand, depicts, in many 
ways, the very suspension that Foucault describes when he writes 
that “the possibility of opening up corpses immediately, thus re-
ducing to a minimum the latency period between death and the 
autopsy, made it possible for the last stage of pathological time and 
the first stage of cadaveric time almost to coincide.” And a moment 
later, that “death is now no more than the vertical, absolutely thin 
line that joins, in dividing them, the series of symptoms and the 
series of lesions” (Foucault 2003, 173).
Bodies would fast-forward this severing distinction; the element 
of the uncanny, the cognitive dissonance that cannot but creep in at 
the sight of the display, comes about as a result of the specimen’s 
having been reconstituted as its living likeness, reenacting the 
events of an idealized daily existence.  The finality of death is ines-
capable in Brakhage’s autopsy film; the cause of each corpse’s death 
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is sometimes obscure, sometimes painfully, wincingly clear, but in 
each case the body is transformed, and in this new, inert phase of 
existence, that is, in death, it demands that reconceptualization 
which is so difficult for the living, and which ensures the poignancy 
of and perseverance of religious custom the world over.
Modern medical science, which surely is equipped with its own 
poignant and bizarre customs, has transformed our concept of the 
body totally.  Today, we can treat its components separately, that we 
may selectively regard parts of the living subject as though already 
dead.  And yet this map of organs without bodies, this materialist 
méconnaissance, is diagnostically invaluable, its description pos-
sessed of a truthfulness that cannot be evaded.  This begs the ques-
tion, where may we locate ourselves between the redoubtable ve-
ridicality of this description and its apparent insufficiency before 
even the first most obvious fact of our subjective experience? Per-
haps it is strange that scientific materialism should remain a scourge 
of philosophy today, when a coherent alternative is scarcely conceiv-
able.  We are materialists by proxy, however uneasily we may sit 
with certain of this doctrine’s implications.  Along these lines, it is 
worth considering that, while religious dualism is held to be a whol-
ly untenable position, and philosophers delight in sniffing out the 
cryptic religious kernel in every humanist prerogative, today we 
face down a technological morality that, even as it chides the be-
liever for enforcing a separation of mind and matter, would separate 
the subject from the body to the fulfilment of political ends.
Implicit in the Dance of Death is a critique of class.  From the la-
bourer who works the field to the highest religious authority, every 
man is equal in death, which is to say before God.  The synonymy 
of these terms is crucial to our formulation; as so much of the sym-
bolism that pervades any discussion of death today was instated in 
the Middle Ages, and in the Middle Ages, death meant to stand in 
the presence of God.
The severe religious injunction that underlies each medieval de-
piction of death was meant as a corrective to earthly hubris, articu-
lating a clear limit to human power and understanding.  Yet a fur-
ther implication of this radical equalization consists in the mantra 
that all things must pass, that life is toil and drudgery; chiefly, in the 
ingenious inversion of class consciousness, which insists that earthly 
injustice is moot even or especially from the standpoint of those who 
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suffer.  The various scientific incarnations of the danse macabre em-
body opposite values, as the Bodies exhibit speaks to a perfectible 
understanding of the human; which is, with Vitruvian man as its 
emblem, the optimistic creed of the Enlightenment.  Bodies presents 
to us an admirable human figure; equality in the guise of biological 
sameness, as it passes over questions of political and economic strat-
ification which are raised not only by the ideological nature of the 
presentation, but the materials themselves, as its organizers engage 
a supply chain which may defile the “universal human” they would 
presume to represent.  Agamben writes, in his theorization of bare 
life, of a “life exposed to death” (Agamben 1998, 81).  If any such 
abject figure can be observed in the Bodies exhibition, it would be 
better described as death exposed to the glare of life.
It may be instructive to compare the strangely calming space of 
the Sedlec Ossuary to the brash, ahistorical transgressiveness of 
Bodies, as each of these arrangements would symbolize the uncon-
ditional terms of our lease on the earth and our own bodies - the 
historical field on the one hand, and biological determination on the 
other.  But the Bodies exhibit would bracket one term unto the pres-
entation of the other, even forcing an eclipse; it is biologism at its 
worst, addressed to an ossified social totality.  Here as for Sloterdijk, 
the body as a closed system represents the isolation of people from 
one another, opening onto a dearth of co-recognition.  Rather than 
abstract, infinite, social man, we are presented with a finite, machin-
ic sociology; a description of the “living representation of perpetual 
motion” (La Mettrie 1994, 32) as a contradictorily staid emblem of 
dynamic processes.  To this worldview, human potential exists not 
even as an abstract negative capacity, nor as the will to collectivity, 
but in strictly recombinatory terms, as combinations of parts.
The key distinction here, and an important point of divergence 
between the religious and scientific conceptions of death as the de-
nominator of all life, is temporal.  The cadaver-double who ap-
pears throughout the medieval corpus, satirizing the worldly vo-
cation of a correspondent body, is not a spook, but represents the 
empty remnant of the life it haunts, ready to swap places with spir-
ited flesh and desiccate while the soul ascends.  This body is a divi-
sor that indicates, importantly, the radical difference between mute 
body parts and personhood, only one of which is subject to putre-
faction.  Here the distinction is fine but important; the body is at-
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emporal, but the spirit is timeless.  In the present-day Dance of 
Death, we are each made contemporary of the body in all its me-
chanical signification, which is not an an-aesthetic object.  We are 
that living thing already dead.
Yet this attempt to reduce the human to a catalogue of physical 
processes cannot forestall the element in which any attempt at such 
a description is already embedded.  For this immobilizing compre-
hensiveness aspires to a state of atemporal perfection, in order that 
ideology may work upon our precise coordinates.  Barthes de-
scribes mathematics, for example, as “a finished language, which 
derives its very perfection from (the) acceptance of death.” To this, 
he opposes Myth, not as an over-determined plurality of customs 
and beliefs, but as a concentrated form of signification which we 
may construe as the empty form of any discourse.  And even this 
finished language may be repackaged by mythological means; Bar-
thes refers to the manner in which a morsel such as “e=mc²” came 
to act as a metonym for physics in its entirety in the popular imagi-
nation.  “Myth, on the contrary, is a language which does not want 
to die:  it wrests from the meanings which give it its sustenance an 
insidious, degraded survival, it provokes in them an artificial re-
prieve in which it settles comfortably, it turns them into speaking 
corpses” (Barthes 1972, 133).  Our propensity to myth makes of the 
human body a dense signifier, as glimpsed in the dazzlingly sug-
gestive surfaces of the exhibits glossed above.
This is a formal feature that divergent religious and scientific con-
ceptions of the body have in common.  The semantic gestalt that one 
may read from the surface of the body is, whatever its content, a 
product of the mythographical impetus to overreach the object of 
the senses, and a certain insistence on the legibility of nature.  How-
ever the body is to be read - as a stolid  rejoinder to the metaphysi-
cian; as the ‘best picture of the human soul;’ as a debased automa-
ton or an angelic unity - this quintessentially aesthetic information 
comprises the active part of its appearance.
This is a separate issue from the instrumental means of the natural 
sciences; and really has very little bearing on the actual physical de-
termination of the natural world.  For it seems foolhardy to object to 
the conception of the body as a “manufacture of the organs” on the 
charge of reductionism; we may be that very thing.  But myth knows 
only artificial causality (Barthes 1971, 130); even to the extent that the 
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Bodies myth, as propagated by the exhibition under examination, 
may in every factual detail correspond to the findings of a responsi-
ble science, and yet this would remain utterly coincidental; its pres-
entation nonetheless a mythical confabulation.  (To this end, biolo-
gism is most threatening when the factual support for its ideological 
claims is verifiably true.  Phrenology, for example, was never such a 
threat to human dignity as many a more innocuous Darwinism, be-
cause it could be falsified by ever more rigorous scientific research; 
hence the connection between allegedly disinterested science and 
dubious value claims, as though one followed naturally upon the 
other, is left intact, even strengthened, by the rejoinder.  One may 
persist in believing that value claims are subject to falsification.) Ide-
ology in this case functions by restoring magical properties to the 
object of science.  The kind of metonymy whereby a single body 
may denote the unchecked claims of a vast discourse bears close re-
lation to the manner in which, by Adorno and Horkheimer’s ac-
count, magic and myth operate.  “Magic implies specific representa-
tion.  What is done to the spear, the hair, the name of the enemy, is 
also to befall his person” (Adorno 2008, 6).   But in every such case, 
the singularity of the effigy produced a worldly remainder, in much 
the same manner that the Christian burial site represents the general 
equality of every man in death, as well as the specific memory of all 
interred therein.  But the object of science is not a representation of 
anything; it is a self-same specimen.  What then is there to say about 
an exhibition such as Bodies, except that it is haunted by its own 
undead remainder, semiotically religious although spiritually be-
reft; for it takes the specimen-object of science and imbues it with a 
mythic narrative of progress, even while exploiting a methodical 
separation from its social context, lest the imaginary causality of my-
thology open onto a new narrative dimension to the display; that of 
a torture gallery.  And can we not find in this shared mythical struc-
ture a space for the assertion of rights?
For universal human rights are a semantic innovation on behalf of 
those who absolutely lack any affordance of health, safety, or self-
determination.  One can imagine the Chinese political prisoner 
shocked to discover that they had been the subject of rights through-
out their torture and detainment; but paradoxically, this privation is 
a pre-requisite to the invocation of rights.  This is a distinctly theo-
logical motif; the by-no-means demonstrable conviction that where 
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there is a body, there is a body of rights; and this positing of an indi-
visible integrity from which rights are derived, and to which rights 
are addressed, is nothing other than a contingent decision, one myth 
among many available to modern taste.  
“In the camps,” Adorno writes, “specimens died rather than in-
dividuals,” depriving the interred of what “ultimate, minimal 
property had been his own” (Schweppenhäuser 2009, 67).  It is, in 
the final, eschatological event, an assertion of exactly this “minimal 
property” belonging to the pre-modern subject that gave the Dance 
of Death its timeless meaning; likewise, before blind obeisance to 
work took over from its ritual function, it was the submersion of the 
individual in a corporealized social tableau allowed the ultimate, 
unsurpassable sacrifice to be enacted upon the living subject in ad-
vance of his or her obliteration.  This ritual-aesthetic participation 
then comprises the basis for those rights that we may hold as unas-
sailable, an extra-legal conductor between persons as though each 
were part of a larger body.  It is in this spirit, I think, that Raoul Va-
neigem proposes as his first, most basic, universal right, “the right 
to become human” (Vaneigem 2003 [my emphasis]).   Any doctrine 
of rights that attempts to forego the processual nature of the posi-
tive appearance of its subject will always be capable only of admin-
istering to bodies, nothing more.
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